Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– )
2015

State of Utah Plaintiff and Appellee v. Michael John Edgar
Defendant and Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons

Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, State of Utah v Edgar, No. 20150594 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2015).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/3686

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– ) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/
utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

No. 20150594-CA
IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

Michael John Edgar,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT

On appeal from the Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah County,
Honorable Lynn W. Davis, District Court No. 131403487

Appellant Michael Edgar is currently incarcerated.

Sean Reyes
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 East 300 South
6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114

Attorney for Plaintiff/ Appellee
State of Utah

Emily Adams (14937)
ADAMS LEGAL LLC
P.O. Box 1564
Bountiful, UT 84011
eadams@adamslegalllc.com
(801) 309-9625

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
Michael John Edgar

l
FiLED
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED TAH APPELLATE COURTS

D[C 16 2u15
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

No. 20150594-CA
INTHE
COURT OF APPEALS OF THE ST ATE OF UT AH

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

Michael John Edgar,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT

On appeal from the Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah County,
Honorable Lynn W. Davis, District Court No. 131403487

Appellant Michael Edgar is currently incarcerated.

Sean Reyes
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 East 300 South
6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114

Attorney for Plaintiff/ Appellee
State of Utah

Emily Adams (14937)
ADAMS LEGAL LLC
P.O. Box 1564
Bountiful, UT 84011
eadams@adamslegalllc.com
(801) 309-9625

Attoniey for Defendant/Appellant
Michael /ohn Edgar

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Table of Contents

Jurisdictional Statement .................................................................................................. 1
Statement of the Issues .................................................................................................... 1
,..i)

Determinative Provisions ............................................................................................... 2
Statement of the Case ...................................................................................................... 3
1.

Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings .................................... 3

2.

Statement of Facts ...................................................................................... 3

Summary of the Argument ............................................................................................ 6
Argument .......................................................................................................................... 7
1.

"

Mr. Edgar's counsel was ineffective ....................................................... 7
1.1

Mr. Edgar's counsel was ineffective for failing to object
to testimony about Mr. Edgar knowing drug dealers .............. 8

1.2

Mr. Edgar's counsel was ineffective for failing to object
to the prosecutor's misstatements in closing argument. ........ 14

1.3

Mr. Edgar has filed a Utah R. App. P. 23B motion
arguing that his counsel was ineffective for failing to
exclude Mr. Edgar's comments made during the course
of plea negotiations ...................................................................... 22

Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 26
Addenda
A

Sentence, Judgment, Commitment in State v. Edgar, District Court Case No.
131403487, on June 24, 2015 (R. 354-56.)

B

Transcript of relevant portions of arresting detective's testimony (R. 51114)

C

Transcript of relevant portions of DEA agent's testimony (R. 593)

i
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

@

D

Transcript of the prosecutor's rebuttal closing argument (R. 672-75)

E

Affidavit of Mr. Edgar filed with Rule 23B Motion

@

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
ii
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Table of Authorities
State Cases

Robinson v. Taylor, 2015 UT 69,356 P.3d 1230 ....................................................... 9, 13
State v. Curtis, 2013 UT App 287, 317 P.3d 968 ......................................................... 21
State v. Gonzalez, 2015 UT 10,345 P.3d 1168 .............................................................. l l
State v. Jones, 2015 UT 19,345 P.3d 1195 .................................................................... l l
State v. King, 2010 UT App 396, 248 P.3d 984 .............................................................. 8
State v. Kozlov, 2012 UT App 114,276 P.3d 1207 .................................................... 1-2
State v. Larrabee, 2013 UT 70,321 P.3d 1136 ......................................... 7, 15, 17, 18-19
State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 15,328 P.3d 841 ..................................................................... 1
State v. Ott, 2010 UT 1, 247 P.3d 344 ......................................................................... 7-8
State v. Thompson, 2014 UT App 14, 318 P.3d 1221 ................................................... 15
State v. Todd, 2007 UT App 349, 173 P.3d 170 ........................................................... 19
West Valley CihJ v. Fieeiki, 2007 UT App 62, 157 P.3d 802 ....................................... 25

Federal Cases

Strickland v. Washington, 466 United States 668 (1984) .............................................. 7
United States v. Carter, 236 F.3d 777 (6th Cir. 2001) .................................................. 17
United States v. Echavarria-Olarte, 904 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1990) ............................. 11
United States v. Espinoza, 244 F.3d 1234 (10th Cir. 2001) ............................................ 9
United States v. Greene, 995 F.2d 793 (8th Cir. 1993) ........................................... 24-25
United States v. Lopez-Medina, 461 F.3d 724 (6th Cir. 2006) ..................................... 10
United States v. Marshall, 173 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 1999) .......................................... 10
United States v. O'Neal, 992 F.2d 1218 (6th Cir. 1993) (unpublished) .................... 24
United States v. Pritchett, 699 F.2d 317 (6th Cir. 1983) .............................................. 10
United States v. Romo, 669 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1982) ............................................... 9-10
United States v. Vallejo, 237 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2001) ......................................... 11-12
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law111
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

United States v. White, 222 F.3d 363 (7th Cir. 2000) ................................................... 17

Statutes and Rules
Utah Code§ 78A-4-103(2)(e) ......................................................................................... 1
Utah R. Evid. 403 ........................................................................................................ 2, 9

@

Utah R. Evid. 410 ...................................................................................................... 2, 24
Utah R. App. P. 23B ...................................................................................................... 22

@

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
iv
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Jurisdictional Statement

This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code§ 78A-4103(2)(e).
The district court issued its Sentence, Judgment, Commitment in State v.

Edgar, District Court Case No. 131403487, on June 24, 2015. (Add. A, R. 354-56.)
vJ

Appellant Michael Edgar filed a timely notice of appeal on July 23, 2015. (R. 35758.)
Statement of the Issues
Issue: Was Mr. Edgar's counsel ineffective when he (1) did not object to

testimony about Mr. Edgar's association with drug dealers; (2) did not object to
the prosecutor's statement in closing argument that misstated the evidence and
that was inflammatory; and (3) did not object to the admission of Mr. Edgar's
statements that were made during the course of plea negotiations?
Standard of Review:
41

11

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel raised for

the first time on appeal presents a question of law that the court reviews for
correctness." State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ,r 11,328 P.3d 841 (quotation omitted).
Preservation:

This issue is not preserved. But an

II

exception to the

preservation requirement is where trial counsel's failure to preserve the issue in
the trial court is the result of ineffective assistance of counsel." State v. Kozlov, 2012
UT App 114, ,r 35, 276 P.3d 1207.
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Determinative Provisions
Utah R. Evid. 403:

The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.
Utah R. Evid. 410(a):

(a) Prohibited Uses. In a civil or criminal case, evidence of the following is not
admissible against the defendant who made the plea or participated in the
plea discussions:
(1) a guilty plea that was later withdrawn;
(2) a nolo contendere plea;
(3) a statement made during a proceeding on either of those pleas under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 or a comparable state procedure; or
(4) a statement made during plea discussions with an attorney for the
prosecuting authority if the discussions did not result in a guilty plea or they
resulted in a later-withdrawn guilty plea.
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Statement of the Case
1.

Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings

By Information, the State charged Mr. Edgar with two counts of possession
of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, two counts of possession or use
of a controlled substance, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. (R.
>d)

1-2.) In that same Information, the State also charged Heather Marsh with

possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. (R. 2.)
The State later amended the Information to exclude Heather Marsh and to add the
allegation that some of the conduct occurred within a drug-free zone. (R. 31-33.)
After a trial, the jury found Mr. Edgar guilty on all counts but determined
that none of the conduct occurred in a drug-free zone. (R. 324-28.) The district
court sentenced Mr. Edgar. (R. 354-56.) Mr. Edgar now appeals.

2.

Statement of Facts

In November 2013, the police were conducting surveillance at a house
VI)

where Mr. Edgar, Mr. Edgar's wife, 1 and Heather Marsh resided. (R. 451-52.) The
police saw a vehicle leave the house and followed it. (R. 452-53.) The vehicle made
a stop at a convenience store, and shortly after the vehicle left the store, the police
stopped it. (R. 453-56.) When the police pulled over the vehicle, they found Ms.

Mr. Edgar has been in a common-law relationship with a woman for several
years. (R. 336.) The woman identified herself as Mr. Edgar's wife. (R. 457.)

1
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Marsh and Mr. Edgar's wife in the car. (R. 456-57.) The officer that testified at trial
never saw Mr. Edgar get into the vehicle and never saw Mr. Edgar at the
convenience store. (R. 526.)
The police brought a drug-sniffing dog to the vehicle, and the dog alerted
to the presence of drugs within the vehicle. (R. 458.) Based on the alert, the police
searched the vehicle and found methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia on Ms.
Marsh. (R. 458.) The police also found a safe in the trunk. (R. 459-60.)
The police found Mr. Edgar at his home and arrested him, brought him to
the vehicle, and told him about the safe. (R. 465-66.) Mr. Edgar refused to divulge
the combination to the safe for fear that it might implicate him. (R. 466.) The police
obtained a search warrant for the safe and found methamphetamine, alprazolam,
oxycodone, 2 and drug paraphernalia inside. (R. 466, 471, 472, 475.) The police then
executed a search warrant at Mr. Edgar's home and found marijuana in his
bedroom. (R. 488, 494.)
At Mr. Edgar's trial, three key witnesses testified: Ms. Marsh (who originally
was Mr. Edgar's co-defendant), a detective, and an agent from the Drug
Enforcement Administration.

The oxycodone pills were found inside a prescription bottle with a label on
it identifying Mr. Edgar and showing that the prescription was filled on August
26, 2013. (R. 476-77.) The police, however, believed that the label on the
prescription bottle was changed. (R. 476.)

2
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Ms. Marsh testified that Mr. Edgar was in the vehicle when the vehicle left
the house and that she and Mr. Edgar's wife dropped him off at a city building.

(R. 558, 560.) She also testified that Mr. Edgar put the safe in the vehicle, kept drugs
in the safe, and had opened the safe several times. (R. 565.) She also admitted that
she had drug paraphernalia in the safe and that she could not exactly remember
viJ

parts of what happened the night Mr. Edgar was arrested because she had "done
quite a bit of drugs." (R. 566, 571.)
The detective testified about an exchange he had with Mr. Edgar. The
detective stated, "[Mr. Edgar] indicated that he knew several-and his words were
big players of people that carry weight which would mean people who distribute
in large amounts of illegal drugs, namely methamphetamine is what we were
speaking about, that he could provide those people in exchange for leniency on
these charges." (Add. B, R. 514.)
Finally, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent testified about

v;;

a conversation he had with Mr. Edgar. According to the agent, Mr. Edgar said
"that he had access to a Mexican source of supply for heroin and that individual
was capable or, or that he was capable of getting pounds from that, from that
target." (Add. C, R. 593.) Mr. Edgar's attorney did not object to the testimony of
the detective or the agent.
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Near the end of his rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury,
"Got a drug dealer admittedly, trying to work off charges with the Major Crimes
Task Force, the DEA, how many of us would have the wherewithal to call the DEA
and say, Hey, I've got these drug charges, I need to work, I'm moving tons of
weight, pounds of heroin." (Add. D, R. 672-73.) Mr. Edgar's attorney did not object
to this statement. (Id.) And after the prosecutor finished his rebuttal, the jury
retired for deliberations without any further instructions from the district court.
(Add. D, R. 675.)
Summary of the Argument

Mr. Edgar's trial counsel was ineffective in three ways.

First, trial counsel did not object to testimony from the detective or the DEA
agent that associated Mr. Edgar with drug dealers. This testimony should have
been excluded under Utah R. Evid. 403 as more prejudicial than probative.

Second, trial counsel did not object to the prosecutor's closing statement that
referred to Mr. Edgar as "a drug dealer admittedly" who was "moving tons of
weight, pounds of heroin." (Add. D, R. 672-73.) This statement was inflammatory.
Moreover, Mr. Edgar never admitted to being a drug dealer, and no evidence
supported the assertion that Mr. Edgar was moving pounds of heroin.
In both instances, Mr. Edgar was prejudiced. The testimony and the
prosecutor's inaccurate statement cast Mr. Edgar as a notorious drug dealer who
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associated with other drug dealers and encouraged the jury to convict Mr. Edgar
regardless of the evidence presented at trial.

Third, Mr. Edgar has filed a Utah R. App. P. 23B motion concurrent with this
brief asserting that his counsel was ineffective when he did not object under Utah

R. Evid. 410 to the admission of Mr. Edgar's statements that were made during the
~

course of plea negotiations.
Argument
Mr. Edgar's counsel was ineffective

1.

Mr. Edgar's trial counsel was ineffective when he failed to object to the
admission of evidence and when he failed to object to the prosecutor's
misstatements during closing argument.
For ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Mr. Edgar must satisfy the

Strickland3 standard, which requires him to prove "(1) that counsel's performance
was so deficient as to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness and
"wP

(2) that but for counsel's deficient performance there is a reasonable probability
that the outcome of the trial would have been different." State v. Larrabee, 2013 UT
70,

,r

18, 321 P.3d 1136 (quotation omitted). "Proving that his counsel's

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness requires [the
defendant] to rebut the strong presumption that under the circumstances, the

3

See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy." State v. Ott, 2010 UT
1,

,r 34, 247 P.3d 344 (quotations omitted). Sound trial strategy does not require

trial counsel to lodge an objection that would be futile. State v. King, 2010 UT App
396, ,r 33, 248 P.3d 984.
1.1

Mr. Edgar's counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
testimony about Mr. Edgar knowing drug dealers.

Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to testimony that Mr. Edgar
knew drug dealers as too prejudicial.
During trial, a detective testified, "[Mr. Edgar] indicated that he knew
several- and his words were big players of people that carry weight which would
mean people who distribute in large amounts of illegal drugs, namely
methamphetamine is what we were speaking about, that he could provide those
people in exchange for leniency on these charges." (Add. B, R. 514.) And a DEA
agent testified that Mr. Edgar informed him "that he had access to a Mexican
source of supply for heroin and that individual was capable or, or that he was
capable of getting pounds from that, from that target." (Add. C, R. 593.) For ease,
the testimony of the detective and the agent quoted above will be cumulatively
referred to as the "Challenged Testimony." Mr. Edgar's counsel did not object to
the Challenged Testimony. (Add. B, R. 514; Add. C, R. 593.)
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Mr. Edgar's counsel was deficient for not objecting to the Challenged Testimony.
Utah R. Evid. 403 allows a court to "exclude relevant evidence if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by a danger of ... unfair prejudice." Here, the minimal
evidentiary value of the Challenged Testimony was significantly outweighed by
the prejudicial nature of that testimony.
The probative value of the Challenged Testimony was low. Courts gauge
the probative value of testimony by, among other things, "its ability to make the
existence of a consequential fact either more or less probable." Robinson v. Taylor,
2015 UT 69,

,r

28, 356 P.3d 1230 (quotation omitted). Here, the Challenged

Testimony shed no light on what happened when the police arrested Mr. Edgar.
Specifically, the Challenged Testimony did not aid the jury in determining crucial
facts in this case, such as whether Mr. Edgar put the safe in the car, whether Mr.
Edgar had control over the safe, whether the drugs in the safe were Mr. Edgar's,
or whether Mr. Edgar intended to distribute the drugs. Nor was there any other
..:J)

connection between the drug dealers and Mr. Edgar and the charged crimes. See

United States v. Espinoza, 244 F.3d 1234, 1240 (10th Cir. 2001) (excluding evidence
of defendant's sons' drug convictions because there was no evidence that sons
were involved in charged crime); United States v. Romo, 669 F.2d 285,289 (5th Cir.
1982) (reasoning that defendant's contact with individuals who had convictions
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for drug-related offenses was irrelevant to whether defendant was engaged in a
drug conspiracy).
Here, all the Challenged Testimony proved was that Mr. Edgar knew drug
dealers. That's it. No evidence-not even a hint of an allegation-existed that the
drug dealers were connected with the charged crimes. The jury realizing that Mr.
Edgar knew some drug dealers was utterly unhelpful in determining whether Mr.
Edgar possessed drugs on the night he was arrested.
But what the Challenged Testimony did do was raise an impermissible
inference that because Mr. Edgar knew drug dealers, he, too, was a drug dealer.

See United States v. Lopez-Medina, 461 F.3d 724, 741-42 (6th Cir. 2006) (reasoning
that "guilt by association" evidence is "irrelevant to the question of a defendant's
actual guilt" and is not probative; consequently, evidence that a defendant "knew
a criminal" should have been excluded); United States v. Marshall, 173 F.3d 1312,
1317 (11th Cir. 1999) (excluding evidence that "tended to establish guilt by
association-because [the defendants] cavorted with drug dealers, they must be
drug dealers themselves"); United States v. Pritchett, 699 F.2d 317, 319 (6th Cir.
1983) (reasoning that prosecutor's questioning about defendant's association with
11

a drug dealer created an inference that because [the defendant] maintained a
relationship with a convicted cocaine dealer, [the defendant] himself was
somehow prone to criminal activity of the same sort").
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The Challenged Testimony inferred guilt by association and was highly
prejudicial. 'The critical question in a rule 403 analysis for unfair prejudice is
whether certain[] testimony is so prejudicial that the jury will be unable to fairly
weigh the evidence." State v. Jones, 2015 UT 19,

,r

30, 345 P.3d 1195 (quotations

omitted). Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it encourages "the jury to find guilt
from improper reasoning," id. (quotations omitted), such as finding a defendant
guilty merely because of an association with others, State v. Gonzalez, 2015 UT 10,

,r 37, 345 P.3d 1168.
Here, the Challenged Testimony encouraged the jury to find Mr. Edgar
guilty because he knew drug dealers. An attorney in trial counsel's position should
have realized that evidence linking a defendant charged with a drug crime to drug
dealers-when there is no evidence that the drug dealers were involved in the
charged crimes- is unfairly prejudicial. See United States v. Echavarria-Olarte, 904
F.2d 1391, 1398 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding testimony that implicitly associated the
defendant with a drug cartel was prejudicial, especially when an association with
the cartel did not bear on any element of the charged crime); see generally United

States v. Vallejo, 237 F.3d 1008, 1017 (9th Cir. 2001), opinion amended on denial of reh'g,
246 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001) (reasoning that the testimony that portrayed the
defendant "as a member of an enormous international drug trafficking
organization and implied that he knew of the drugs in his car because of his role
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in that organization" was prejudicial because the defendant "was not alleged to be
associated with a drug trafficking organization in even the most minor way").
The Challenged Testimony was both minimally probative and unduly
prejudicial; Mr. Edgar's attorney should have realized that the testimony should
have been excluded under Rule 403 and therefore was deficient for not objecting
to the testimony.

Mr. Edgar was prejudiced. Mr. Edgar was prejudiced by trial counsel's failure
to object to the Challenged Testimony.
The evidence against Mr. Edgar was not strong. The police found drugs in
Mr. Edgar's wife's vehicle after the vehicle left Mr. Edgar's home. But Mr. Edgar
was not in the vehicle when the police found the drugs, and no officer saw Mr.
Edgar get in the vehicle, even though the officers were surveilling Mr. Edgar's
home. (R. 451-52, 546-57, 526.)
The police did find drugs on the passenger in the vehicle, Ms. Marsh. (R.
456-58.) It was Ms. Marsh- who was originally Mr. Edgar's co-defendant and who

had drugs and drug paraphernalia on her the night Mr. Edgar was arrested-who
said that the safe of drugs was Mr. Edgar's. (R. 565.) Ms. Marsh also testified at
trial that she could not exactly remember parts of what happened the night Mr.
Edgar was arrested because she had" done quite a bit of drugs." (R. 566, 571.)
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Because the evidence against Mr. Edgar was not strong, the Challenged
~

Testimony-the evidence that Mr. Edgar knew drug dealers-allowed the jury to
look beyond the facts presented and make the impermissible inference that Mr.
Edgar possessed the drugs found in the vehicle because he knew drug dealers. The
inference to be drawn from the evidence of Mr. Edgar's knowledge of the identity
of drug dealers may have led the jury to conclude that Mr. Edgar should be
punished "regardless of his liability in this particular case." Robinson, 2015 UT 69,
~

37. Consequently, Mr. Edgar's counsel was deficient for not objecting to the

Challenged Testimony under Rule 403, and Mr. Edgar was prejudiced by his
counsel's failure to object.
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1.2

Mr. Edgar's counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the
prosecutor's misstatements in closing argument.

Mr. Edgar's trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the
prosecutor's statements during closing arguments that misstated the evidence and
that were inflammatory.
During the trial, the State introduced evidence that Mr. Edgar made
statements that he knew drug dealers. (Add. B, R. 514; Add. C, R. 593.) Specifically,
a DEA agent testified that Mr. Edgar said "that he had access to a Mexican source
of supply for heroin and that individual was capable or, or that he was capable of
getting pounds from that, from that target." (Add. C., R. 593.) But the State
presented no evidence of any statement by Mr. Edgar where he admitted to
possessing the drugs found in his wife's car.
In the prosecutor's rebuttal closing argument, he told the jury:
Got a drug dealer admittedly, trying to work off charges
with the Major Crimes Task Force, the DEA, how many
of us would have the wherewithal to call the DEA and
say, Hey, I've got these drug charges, I need to work,
I'm moving tons of weight, pounds of heroin. Who else
mentioned heroin? Mr. Stewart said no one else
mentioned heroin. Heather Marsh mentioned heroin.
What does the defendant keep in his safe? Meth, heroin,
pills, oxys or oxys, Clonazepam.

(Add. D., R. 672-73 (emphasis added).) Mr. Edgar's trial counsel did not object to
the prosecutor's statement, and the district court never issued any type of curative
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instruction. (Add. D, R. 673-75.) The statement came at the end of the prosecutor's
rebuttal, and shortly thereafter the jury was released for deliberations. (Add. D, R.
675.)
In a prosecutorial misconduct claim brought in the ineffective assistance of
counsel context, a court examines (1) whether the prosecutor's statements are

"°

improper, (2) whether trial counsel performed unreasonably by not objecting to
the comments, and (3) whether the deficient conduct was prejudicial. State v.

Thompson, 2014 UT App 14, ,r 45, 318 P.3d 1221.
The prosecutor's statement in closing was improper. "Prosecutors are held to a
high standard regarding their conduct, given the possibility that the jury will give
special weight to the prosecutor's arguments, not only because of the prestige
associated with the prosecutor's office, but also because of the fact-finding
facilities presumably available to the office." Id.

,r 43

(quotations omitted). "In

closing arguments, a prosecutor may draw reasonable inferences based upon the
~

demeanor of the witness. However, counsel is precluded from arguing matters not
in evidence." Id.

,r

63 (quotations and citation omitted). "[W]hen a prosecutor

insinuates that other evidence exists he encourages the jury to determine its verdict
based upon evidence outside the record and jeopardizes a defendant's right to a
trial based upon the evidence presented." Larrabee, 2013 UT 70,

,r 23 (quotation

omitted).
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Here, the prosecutor made two statements that were not supported by the
evidence in the record: (1) the statement that Mr. Edgar was "a drug dealer
admittedly" and (2) the statement that Mr. Edgar was "moving tons of weight,
pounds of heroin." (Add. D, R. 672.)
First, the statement that Mr. Edgar was "a drug dealer admittedly" finds no
support in the record. (Id.) No testimony existed of Mr. Edgar admitting or
confessing that the drugs found in vehicle were his. There was quite a bit of
testimony about Mr. Edgar knowing drug dealers (Add. B, R. 514; Add. C, R. 593),
and Ms. Marsh even testified that Mr. Edgar kept the drugs in the safe "for
selling," (R. 566) but there was no evidence of Mr. Edgar stating that the drugs
were his. The prosecutor's statement that Mr. Edgar was "a drug dealer
admittedly" simply was not true.
Second, the prosecutor's statement that Mr. Edgar was "moving tons of
weight, pounds of heroin" was not supported by evidence in the record. (Add. D.,

R. 672.) What was in the record was Mr. Edgar's statement to the agent that he had

access to someone who could supply pounds of heroin, not that Mr. Edgar himself
was moving pounds of heroin. (Compare Add. C., R. 593 with Add. D, R. 672.) The
difference between access to an individual with pounds of heroin and moving
pounds of heroin is significant. The latter casts Mr. Edgar as a serious drug dealer.
The jump from access to a heroin supplier to being the heroin supplier is a

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law16
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

misstatement of the evidence and is too far of a leap to be considered a reasonable
inference drawn from the evidence. See generally United States v. Carter, 236 F.3d
777, 784-85 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that prosecutor committed misconduct when
he misstated the testimony of a witness during closing arguments); United States

v. White, 222 F.3d 363, 370 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that prosecutor engaged in
I,@

misconduct when he referenced facts in the closing argument that were not in
evidence).
Not only was the prosecutor's statement that Mr. Edgar was moving
"pounds of heroin" not supported by the evidence, it was also inflammatory. The
State charged Mr. Edgar with possession of drugs with intent to distribute; a
statement that Mr. Edgar distributed "pounds of heroin" cast Mr. Edgar as a highlevel drug dealer and encouraged the jury to punish Mr. Edgar regardless of his
conduct in this case. See generally Larrabee, 2013 UT 70, ,r 25 ("Within the context of
a criminal trial for the sexual abuse of a child, it is difficult to conceive of a more
inflammatory statement than that offered by the prosecutor-namely, that
Defendant had a prior history of child sex abuse.")
In sum, the prosecutor's statement was improper because it misstated the
evidence and was inflammatory.

Trial counsel performed unreasonably by not objecting to the comments. Because
there was no evidence that Mr. Edgar admitted to being a drug dealer and there
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was no evidence that Mr. Edgar was moving "pounds of heroin," Mr. Edgar's trial
counsel should have been immediately aware that the prosecutor's statement was
both improper and inflammatory. Because the statement was improper and
inflammatory, Mr. Edgar's trial counsel should have immediately objected, moved
for a mistrial, or asked for a curative instruction. See id.

,r

26 (reasoning that

because of the prosecutor's "obviously improper and inflammatory comments,
defense counsel should have immediately objected and moved for a mistrial or, at
the very least, demanded a curative instruction"). But trial counsel did nothing.
And soon after the prosecutor made the statement, the jury was dismissed to
deliberate without any further instructions from the district court.
Sound trial strategy may include remaining silent so as to not emphasize the
prejudicial nature of the statement to the jury. But see id.

,r

31 ("[T]he 'fear of

highlighting' argument should be analyzed with some skepticism. For at bottom,
when accepted, it permits the State to engage in improper conduct without
consequence.").
Yet in this case, remaining silent was not sound trial strategy. See id.

,r 26-

27. The statement was obviously improper and highly prejudicial to Mr. Edgar.
Mr. Edgar was on trial for possessing drugs with intent to distribute, so a comment
about Mr. Edgar distributing "pounds of heroin" does "not pass by unnoticed,
particularly within the context of a criminal trial for that very crime." Id.
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,r 29. "An

objection simply would not have highlighted the [statement] any more
significantly than it already was." Id. In fact, it was" unreasonable for counsel to fear
highlighting [the statement] by objecting because [it was] already brightly
highlighted by [its] very nature." Id. Consequently, Mr. Edgar's trial counsel
performed deficiently by not objecting to the prosecutor's statement in closing
~

argument.

Mr. Edgar was prejudiced by the deficient conduct. "In determining whether a
defendant has been prejudiced by prosecutorial misconduct, [a court] consider[s]
the case as a whole, including evidence of Defendant's guilt." State v. Todd, 2007
UT App 349, , 35, 173 P.3d 170. "[I]f proof of defendant's guilt is strong, the
challenged conduct or remark will not be presumed prejudicial." Id. (quotations
omitted). Yet "when the evidence in the record is circumstantial or sufficiently
conflicting, jurors are more likely influenced by an improper argument. In such
instances, they are more susceptible to the suggestion that factors other than the
vJ

evidence before them should determine a defendant's guilt or innocence." Id.
(quotation omitted).
As argued above, in section 1.1 infra, the evidence against Mr. Edgar was
not overwhelming. The police found drugs in Mr. Edgar's wife's vehicle after the
vehicle left Mr. Edgar's home, but Mr. Edgar was not in the vehicle when the police
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found the drugs, and no officer saw Mr. Edgar get in the vehicle, even though the
officers were surveilling Mr. Edgar's home. (R. 451-52, 546-57, 526.)
The police did find drugs and drug paraphernalia on the passenger in the
vehicle, Ms. Marsh. (R. 456-58.) And Ms. Marsh testified that the safe of drugs was
Mr. Edgar's. (R. 565.) But Ms. Marsh also testified at trial that she could not exactly
remember parts of what happened the night Mr. Edgar was arrested because she
had" done quite a bit of drugs." (R. 566, 571.)
Furthermore, the prosecutor's comment came at the end of his rebuttal. Mr.
Edgar's attorney had no chance to correct the comment (outside of making an
objection, which he did not do), and the district court did not instruct the jury after
the rebuttal ended to emphasize to the jury that the prosecutor's comments were
not evidence. Instead, the jury was dismissed to deliberate. The improper
comment, coming so close to the end of trial, tainted the jury deliberation process.
In sum, Mr. Edgar's trial counsel should have realized that the prosecutor's
statements about Mr. Edgar being a" drug dealer admittedly" and "moving tons
of weight, pounds of heroin" misstated the evidence and did not constitute a
reasonable inference drawn from the evidence. Furthermore, trial counsel should
have objected to the statement because it was inflammatory and prejudicial to Mr.
Edgar. And finally, Mr. Edgar was prejudiced by his counsel's failure to object; the
evidence against Mr. Edgar was not strong, the prosecutor's statement came right
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before the jury deliberation process, and the district court did not give any
intervening jury instruction cautioning the jury that the attorneys' statements were
not evidence. Consequently, Mr. Edgar's attorney was ineffective for failing to
object to the prosecutor's misstatements in closing argument and Mr. Edgar was
prejudiced thereby.
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1.3

Mr. Edgar has filed a Utah R. App. P. 23B motion arguing that his
counsel was ineffective for failing to exclude Mr. Edgar's
comments made during the course of plea negotiations.

Concurrent with this brief, Mr. Edgar has filed a Utah R. App. P. 23B motion
requesting remand. "Rule 23B motions are available only in limited circumstances,
to supplement the record with known facts needed for an appellant to assert an
ineffectiveness of counsel claim on direct appeal." State v. Curtis, 2013 UT App 287,

,r 15, 317 P.3d

968 (quotation omitted). A Rule 23B motion must" (1) contain a

nonspeculative allegation of facts that (2) do not fully appear in the record, which,

if true, (3) could support a determination that counsel's performance was deficient,
and (4) demonstrate that the defendant suffered prejudice as a result." Id.
Additionally, Rule 23B motions must "be accompanied by affidavits ... that show
the claimed prejudice suffered by the appellant as a result of the claimed deficient
performance." Utah R. App. P. 23B(b). In his Rule 23B motion, Mr. Edgar has
requested remand to supplement the record on whether trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to the detective's testimony about what Mr. Edgar
said during plea negotiations.
At trial, a detective testified about conversations he had with Mr. Edgar
about cooperating with law enforcement in exchange for leniency on his charges.
(Add. B, R. 511.) The detective testified that before he could make a deal with Mr.
Edgar he had to talk to the prosecuting attorney. (Add. B, R. 511-12.) Eventually
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ti .. ,

Vi

Mr. Edgar did provide the detective with some information. (Add. B, R. 512.)
During an exchange with the detective, Mr. Edgar "indicated that he knew
several- and his words were big players of people that carry weight which would
mean people who distribute in large amounts of illegal drugs, namely
methamphetamine is what we were speaking about, that he could provide those
~

people in exchange for leniency on these charges." (Add. B, R. 514.)
Although the record contains the detective's testimony about negotiations
with Mr. Edgar, it does not contain any information about Mr. Edgar's views of
those negotiations.
Attached to the Rule 23B motion and this brief is Mr. Edgar's affidavit. In
that affidavit, Mr. Edgar testifies that the detective was one of his arresting officers
for the charged crimes in this case. (Add. E, Edgar Aff. if 4.) Mr. Edgar testifies that
while he was in jail, after he was charged, the detective came to talk with him and
asked him if he knew of any other drug dealers in the area. (Id. if 5.) The detective

~

said that the more information that Mr. Edgar could give him, the better deal he
would get. (Id.) Furthermore, the detective told him that if Mr. Edgar gave him
information, the detective would reduce the charges against Mr. Edgar or reduce
his sentence. (Id.)
Mr. Edgar further testifies that after he bonded out of jail, the detective

viJ

asked him if he could be a confidential informant. (Id. if 8.) But before Mr. Edgar

..;)
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could sign all the papers so that he could officially be a confidential informant, the
detective asked Mr. Edgar to meet him at a certain location at a certain time in the
evening. (Id.

,r 10.) During that meeting, the detective asked him questions about

several people and asked him to do a controlled buy. (Id.) Mr. Edgar believed that
while he was giving the detective this information, the detective would reduce his
charges or that he would not do prison time; Mr. Edgar testified that he gave the
detective that information because he believed that by doing so his charges would
be reduced. (Id

,r,r 11-12.)

Utah R. Evid. 410 prohibits the use of "a statement made during plea
discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting authority if the discussions did
not result in a guilty plea." "This rule can be fairly read to apply to statements
made to a government attorney during the course of plea discussions or to an
agent whom the government attorney has authorized to engage in plea
discussions," including a law enforcement officer. United States v. O'Neal, 992 F.2d
1218, at *8 (6th Cir. 1993) (unpublished). 4 Consequently, "a government agent's
representation that he had the authority to negotiate a plea bargain might be
sufficient to bring any consequent statements by a criminal defendant within the

Mr. Edgar references federal law here because Utah's Rule 401 is "the
federal rule, verbatim." Utah R. Evid. 401 advisory comm. note.

4
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excludability provisions of the rules." United States v. Greene, 995 F.2d 793, 799 (8th
Cir. 1993).
Courts apply a two-tiered test to determine whether a statement was made
in the course of plea negotiations. W. Valley CihJ v. Fieeiki, 2007 UT App 62,

,r 23,

157 P.3d 802. First, the court must determine "whether the accused exhibited an
J

actual subjective expectation to negotiate a plea at the time of the discussion." Id.
(quotation omitted). Second, the court must determine "whether the accused's
expectation was reasonable given the totality of the objective circumstances." Id.
(quotation omitted).
Here, Mr. Edgar's affidavit shows that he exhibited an actual subjective
expectation to negotiate a plea at the time he made his comments to the detective.
The conversations Mr. Edgar had with the detective occurred after the charges had
been filed against Mr. Edgar, so a plea negotiation was a natural next step. (Add.
E, Edgar Aff.

,r,r

2-5). He testified that the detective told him that the more

information he gave the detective, the better deal Mr. Edgar would get. (Id.

,r 5.)

Mr. Edgar also testified that the detective told him that if Mr. Edgar gave him
information, the detective would reduce Mr. Edgar's charges or reduce his
sentence. (Id.)
Moreover, Mr. Edgar's expectation was reasonable given the totality of the
circumstances. Although the detective testified that he could not negotiate with
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Mr. Edgar before talking with the prosecutor, Mr. Edgar testified that over the
course of several months the detective spoke with Mr. Edgar about giving him
information about drug dealers and informed Mr. Edgar that his cooperation
would result in lower charges or reduced sentence. (Id. 115-12.) Given this, Mr.
Edgar's expectation that he was negotiating his plea by cooperating with the police
was reasonable.
For these reasons, the comments Mr. Edgar made to the detective should be
excluded under Rule 410. Given the information that is not on the record, Mr.
Edgar's attorney was ineffective for failing to exclude the detective's comments.
And as argued in sections 1.1 and 1.2, supra, Mr. Edgar was prejudiced because the
evidence against him was not strong, and evidence about his knowledge of drug
dealers suggested to the jury to convict Mr. Edgar because of his association with
drug dealers rather than the facts in evidence.
Conclusion

This Court should vacate Mr. Edgar's convictions because his trial counsel
was ineffective. First, his trial counsel did not object to testimony about Mr.
Edgar's knowledge of the identity of drug dealers; that testimony was minimally
probative and unduly prejudicial. Second, his trial counsel did not object to the
prosecutor's statement in closing argument that misstated the evidence and that
was inflammatory. Finally, Mr. Edgar has filed a Rule 23B motion alleging that his
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trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission of Mr. Edgar's
comments made during the course of plea negotiations.
For all these reasons, Mr. Edgar respectfully requests that this Court vacate
his convictions.
DATED this 14th day of December, 2015.

Emily Adams (14937)
ADAMS LEGAL LLC

P.O. Box 1564
Bountiful, UT 84011
eadams@adamslegalllc.com
(801) 309-9625

Attoniey for Defendant/Appellant
Michael Edgar
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Addendum A
Sentence, Judgment, Commitment in State v. Edgar, District Court Case No.
131403487, on June 24, 2015 (R. 354-56.)
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4TH DISTRICT COURT - PROVO
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

FILED

g~=t

STATE OF UTAH

V$)

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

lJTAHCOUNry
MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.
MICHAEL JOHN EDGAR,
Defendant.
custody: Utah County Jail

Case No: 131403487 FS
Judge:
LYNN W DAVIS
Date:
June 24, 2015

PRESENT
treenah
Clerk:
Prosecutor: JOHNSON, CRAIG R
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): STEWART, GREGORY V
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: September 16, 1980
Audio
Tape Count: 11:36
301-15
Tape Number:

\JU

CHARGES
1. POSS W/ INTENT TO
Plea: Guilty 2. POSS W/ INTENT TO
Plea: Guilty POSSESSION
OR USE
3.
Plea: Guilty 4. POSSESSION OR USE
Plea: Guilty s. USE OR POSSESSION
Plea: Guilty SENTENCE PRISON

DIST C/SUBSTANCE (amended) - 2nd Degree Felony
Disposition: 04/14/2015 Guilty
DIST C/SUBSTANCE (amended) - 2nd Degree Felony
Disposition: 04/14/2015 Guilty
OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (amended} - Class B Misdemeanor
Disposition: 04/14/2015 Guilty
OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (amended) - Class B Misdemeanor
Disposition: 04/14/2015 Guilty
OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA (amended} - Class B Misdemeanor
Disposition: 04/14/2015 Guilty

Based on the defendant's conviction of POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE a 2nd Degree
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year
nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE a 2nd Degree
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year
nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.
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Case No: 131403487 Date:

Jun 24, 2015

COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.

To the UTAH County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your custody for
transportation to the Utah State Prison where the defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
Sentence to run concurrent.
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE
Court recommends Defendant not serve a lengthy sentence. Court recommends defendant be
given credit for time served of 257 days, the court also recommends defendant
participate in the Conquest Program.
SENTENCE JAIL

Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a
Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 180 day(s)
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a
Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 180 day(s) The total time
suspended for this charge is 180 day(s).
Based on the defendant's conviction of USE OR POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA a Class
B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 180 day(s) The total time
suspended for this charge is 180 day(s).
Credit is granted for 180 day(s) previously served.
SENTENCE FINE
Charge# 1
Fine: $10000.00
Suspended: $10000.00
Charge# 2

Fine: $10000.00
Suspended: $10000.00

Charge# 3

Fine: $1000.00
Suspended: $1000.00

Charge# 4

Fine: $1000.00
Suspended: $1000.00

Charge# 5

Fine: $1000.00
Suspended: $1000.00
Total Fine: $23000.00
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Case No: 131403487 Date:
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Jun 24, 2015

Total Suspended: $23000.00
Total Surcharge: $0
Total Principal Due: $0
Plus Interest
CUSTODY
The defendant is present in the custody of the Utah County jail.
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Addendum B
Transcript of relevant portions of arresting detective's testimony
(R. 511-14)
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1

drugs were his, they weren't hers at all.

2

Q

Okay.

3

A

Meaning Arja.

4

Q

Yeah.

5

Okay.

And what offers did he further make

regarding any cooperation?
A

6

Again,

in that interview he continued to talk about

7

that he would provide cooperation or he would give us big

8

people, he had involvement or had ties to people that he

9

could offer up to us in exchange for leniency on these

10

charges.

11

Q

How soon could he provide that information to you?

12

A

He wanted to get out of jail right then and there.

13

He wanted us to walk him out and go do it right then.

14
15

Q

Okay.

Okay.

Did you talk to him about signing him

up as a confidential informant at that time?

16

A

We did; however, at that point it was, we were well

17

within the - we needed to speak with the attorney that was

18

assigned to it before we tried to do anything.

19

take someone out of jail on a whim.

20

through at that point.

21

We can't just

There's processes to go

Q

Okay, and you, and you told the defendant about

23

A

Correct.

24

Q

And so how were things left with him?

25

A

Things were left with him as we would need to speak

22

that?

128
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1

with the prosecuting attorney at that time to see what he'd

2

be willing to do,

3

in exchange for leniency.

4

5

Q

Okay.

if he would be willing to allow him to work

All right.

In speaking with the defendant

did he ever refer to Arja as anything other than his wife?

6

A

Not to my recollection ever.

7

Q

Okay.

8

Did he ever deny knowledge of the safe or

its contents?

9

A

No.

10

Q

Did you ever give the defendant your cell phone

11

number?

12

A

I did.

13

Q

Okay.

14

Did he ever contact you after this November

25:r. interview at the

jail to talk about working again?

15

A

Yes.

16

Q

Okay, when's the first time that you recall?

17

A

Time frame is going to be -

18

Q

Weeks, months?

19

A

- weeks at least.

20
21
22

He called and attempted to

provide information to work.
Q

Okay, and was that something you were interested in

following up on?

23

A

Not really,

no.

24

Q

How many times did he call you after that?

25

A

I'd have to say multiple times over the course of
129

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

000512

I

1

that and to early the next spring or summer, probably 15 or

2

20 times is a good guess.

3

Q

Okay.

4

A

We attempted to try to work but he couldn't provide

what he was saying he could.

5

Q

6

7
8

in this case, what was he saying he could provide that didn't
1

end up panning out?
THE COURT:

9

10

And when you say that with respect to the charges

Approach again if you will, counsel,

just for about 30 seconds.

11

(Whereupon a sidebar was held as follows:

12

THE COURT:

- somewhere (inaudible) my ruling

13

(inaudible).

14

(inaudible) that leads as to these charges 'cause even though

15

your questions are accurate and focused -

You may have to -

16

MR. JOHNSON:

17

THE COURT:

(Inaudible).
- he may open up and say something else

18

that will be improper.

19

MR. JOHNSON:

20

THE COURT:

21

(End of sidebar)

22

Q

just very briefly in terms of

Okay.
Okay.

(BY MR. JOHNSON)

Detective, with respect to these

23

charges, you said the defendant contacted you at least,

24

approximately 15 times over the next several months, you said

25

until spring or summer of 2014?
130
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1

A

Correct.

2

Q

Okay.

And what sort of things did he offer you

3

that he could provide in exchange for leniency on these

4

charges?

5
6

A
1

9

10

words were big players of people that carry weight which
would mean people who distribute in large amounts of illegal

7

8

1

drugs,

namely methamphetamine is what we were speaking about,

that he could provide those people in exchange for leniency
on these charges.

11
12

Ummm, he indicated that he knew several - and his

Q

Okay, and when you say provide these people,

just

give you a name and address or what?
A

13

Provide - without going into detail about those

14

things it would be just provide information that would lead

15

us to probable cause for an arrest in dealing with the other

16

person.

17
18

Q

Did he actually give you names during these

conversations?

19

A

Yes, there were several names.

20

Q

Were these names significant to you, that you felt

21

were worth looking into?

22

A

No, sir.

23

Q

Okay.

Did you actually ever go to a location to

24

conduct an operation involving the defendant that did not pan

25

out?
131
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AddendumC
Transcript of relevant portions of DEA agent's testimony (R. 593)
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1

would be willing to work with him,

2

time in fact.

if he's actually worth my

3

Q

Describe that conversation to the jury.

4

A

So I asked him what level of cooperation he'd be

5

able to provide me, what types of drug traffickers and what

6

quantities of drugs he was capable of obtaining.

7

me that he could,

8

supply for heroin and that individual was capable or, or that

9

he was capable of getting pounds from that,

He informed

that he had access to a Mexican source of

10

Q

Did that interest you?

11

A

It did interest me.

from that target.

Ummm, obviously a pound level

12

heroin dealer is worth the DEA's time in Utah and it was

13

something that we were willing to pursue at that point.

14
15
16

Q

So did you talk to him about the parameters of what

would be expected of him if you were to accept his offer?
A

We did preliminarily discuss some of the

17

requirements of a confidential source, didn't go into great

18

detail with it because there were some other things that I

19

needed to resolve before I wanted to go further into that.

20

It's kind of one of those things that you don't want to

21

overstep your bounds -

22

MR. JOHNSON:

23

worry, Judge,

I

Sorry,

if we could have just a sec,

just - it's hard to hear.

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. JOHNSON:

Thank you, Officer Raez.
Appreciate that.
210
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Addendum D
Transcript of the prosecutor's rebuttal closing argument (R. 672-75)
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1

conduct he used with Detective Palmer the day of the first

2

phone call, from the first in-person meeting,

3

later at the jail when he's still offering up to work.

4

Imagine his surprise, you know, seven months later to get a

5

call from DEA agents saying Mr. Edgar wants to work with us

6

now, he's not satisfied with what you did.

7

comments were, yeah, we didn't work with him.

8

information that's unique to Mr. Edgar was transmitted to

9

this DEA agent whose here just to tell you about this

10

conversation.

11

or me, goes to his credibility.

12

from four days

Well, his
So again,

He didn't have a prior relationship with him

You know, Mr. Stewart didn't mention it much in his

1

13

closing but during his cross examination of the Crime Lab,

14

Amberlee Neibaur, he's asking her about prescription

15

methamphetamine, isn't there such a thing as prescription

16

methamphetamine?

17

Okay, that's a doubt.

18

methamphetamine.

19

reasonable doubt.

20

work off charges with the Major Crimes Task Force, the DEA,

21

how many of us would have the wherewithal to call the DEA and

22

say, Hey,

23

moving tons of weight, pounds of heroin.

24

heroin?

25

1

Sure, it's possible.

Is that a doubt?

There's such a thing as prescription

Is that a reasonable doubt?

No,

it's not a

Got a drug dealer admittedly, trying to

I've got these drug charges,

I need to work,

I'm

Who else mentioned

Mr. Stewart said no one else mentioned heroin.

Heather Marsh mentioned heroin.

What does the defendant keep
36
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1

in his safe?

2

Just because heroin and Clonazepam weren't in the safe, does

3

that mean it's not his safe all of a sudden?

4

ladies and gentlemen, you're looking at the evidence that's

5

before you that has to be reasonable and the reasonable

6

explanation is that he's a drug dealer and you'll get two

7

carts worth of evidence.

8

for Mr. Edgar, someone is using his name, called the DEA?

9

Someone has a safe of his that they've put all their stuff

10

in?

Meth, heroin, pills, oxys or oxys, Clonazepam.

No.

Ultimately

I mean, is this all just a bad day

That's not reasonable.

11

When you focus on the possession with intent to

12

distribute in a drug free zone, that's a lot of verbiage, a

13

lot of clauses, a lot of phrases when you all run it

14

altogether.

15

he had to intend to distribute those items at that 7-Eleven.

16

That's not what we're here to say.

17

them by that 7-Eleven and why did he possess them?

18

talked about this, this isn't his personal use, isn't his

19

personal stash, he possesses them because he's a drug dealer.

20

He's possessing with intent to distribute.

21

possessing them?

22

Elementary School, that's what makes it a drug free zone.

23

don't get hung up on, oh, we have to show that he had to

24

possess them, distribute them right there within the drug

25

free zone.

What you need to look at is it doesn't mean that

We're saying he possessed
Well, we

Where is he

Well, it's within 1000 feet of Lindon
So

He could have wanted to distribute them that
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1

night,

the next day, as long as he possessed them within that

2

area with the intent to distribute them at some point, that's

3

enough.
When you look at the evidence, reasons why the

4
5

defendant possessed the safe because Mr. Stewart talked

6

about, Oh,

7

some more proof that way.

8

1

9

it was never fingerprinted. Oh, we should have had
You've also got Heather's

testimony about he had access to it, how he had it from the
couch, how he packed it, how he transported it into the car,

10

the whole combination thing.

Who had access to this?

Why

11

are the police monkeying around with him if they've got Arja

12:

and Heather who are giving up information left and right?

13

Heather is saying, Oh, yeah,

14

of a sudden she's going to say, oh, but I'm not going to give

15

you the combination for that safe but by the way there's a

16

safe in the trunk.

17

truth and saying,

18

no combination to it.

19

Mr. Edgar.

20

owned it?

21

that he tells the police,

22

it might implicate me so I'm not going to do that.

23

know,

24

really work out.

25

Again,

I've got it in my bra, but all

Or is more likely that she's telling the
Hey,

I had no combination to it, Arja had
That's why the police were talking to

Why would he have the combination to it unless he
And why would that be corroborated by the fact
I'll give you the combination but

frankly saying that implicates you.

Well, you

So that didn't

his pill bottle was inside and just
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1

painfully over and over again he asked police not to open it.

2

Why would you care if you don't know what's inside?
Then under reasons why he possessed with intent to

3

4

distribute, again, half an ounce of meth, 28 pills of

5

oxycontin, you know,

6

street and they have a pill bottle in their pocket,

7

oxycontin, and that's all they have, private personal use,

8

private prescription,

9

totality of everything we have here, why is he possessing

10

these things?

11

if someone else is walking down the

I agree.

20

But when you look at it in

To distribute them.

In the end ladies and gentlemen, he had a mobile

12

pharmacy.

You heard testimony about - a mobile pharmacy but

13

he is not a pharmacist.

14

Detective Palmer that, he told Agent Holmer that and his

15

actions and statements and the totality of the evidence back

16

that up and I ask that you find him guilty on all counts.

17

Thank you.

He is a drug dealer.

He told

18

THE COURT:

19

Let's have the deputy then sworn please.

20

Thank you, Mr. Johnson.

stand and raise your right hand.

21

(Whereupon the bailiff was sworn)

22

THE COURT:

Ladies and gentlemen,

23

for your deliberations.

24

exhibits.

25

If you'll

now is the time

We will deliver to you all of the

Here's the original jury verdict form.
Officer, please,

if you'll take that and place that
39
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Addendum E
Affidavit of Mr. Edgar filed with Rule 23B Motion
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EMILY M. R. ADAMS (14937)
Adams Legal LLC
1310 Madera Hills Dr.
Bountiful, UT 84010
Telephone: (801) 309-9625
Email: eadams@adamslegalllc.com

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL
EDGAR

Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.

App. No. 20150594-CA

MICHAEL EDGAR,

Defendant / Appellant.

)

STATE OF UTAH

:ss
COUNTY OF SANPETE

)

I, Michael Edgar, first duly sworn and upon oath, a resident of this

state and an individual over the age of 21, hereby state as follows:
1.

I was arrested.for drug-related offenses in November 2013.
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2.

I was charged with the drug-related charges in this case on

November 28, 2013.
3.

I remained in jail from November 2013 until late December

2013, when I bonded out.
4.

For the offenses in this case, one of the arresting officers was

named Detective Palmer.

5.

While I was in jail, Detective Palmer came to talk to me. He

asked me if I knew of any other drug dealers in the area. He said I should
contact him if I had any information. He said that the more information I
would give him, the better deal I would get. He said that if I gave him
information that he would reduce the charges against me or reduce my
sentence.
6.

Detective Palmer also called me and asked if I had any

information about specific drug dealers.
7.

I bonded out of jail at the end of December 2013.

8.

Sometime between January 2014 and March 2014, Detective

Palmer told me that he wanted me to come into his office to sign some
papers to be a confidential informant.
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9.

One night during that time, Detective Palmer asked me to meet

him at a certain location, and he said that we would sign the confidential
informant papers later.
10.

I arrived at the location and found Detective Palmer. He asked

me questions about a bunch of people. He also asked me to set up a phone
call to do a controlled buy for a very small amount of drugs. He also had
me identify a house out of which people were dealing drugs. I met with the
detective for about two hours.
11.

During this time, Detective Palmer told me that if I were a

confidential informant and gave him information, my charges would be
reduced and that I wouldn't do any prison time related to the crimes
charged in this case.
12.

I gave the detective the information he asked about because I

believed that by doing so he would reduce my charges or my sentence.

Further Affiant saith naught.
DATED this 1

day of December 2015.
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VERIFICATION
STATE OF UTAH
)

:ss
)
COUNTY OF SANPETE

On this r~._r-, day of December 2015 personally appeared before me
Michael Edgar who duly acknowledge to me that she prepared the
following Affidavit and knows the contents thereof to be correct.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this r .- i··j day of December
2015.
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